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SURPRISE! THAT DAMAGING TURNCOAT
WITNESS IS STILL WITH US: AN ANALYSIS OF
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 607, 801(d)(1)(A)
AND 403
Abraham P. Ordover*
In adopting Rule 607 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,1
Congress has abrogated the common law rule which placed
severe restrictions on the ability of a party to impeach its own
witness.' While Rule 607 perihits impeachment of one's own
witness, 3 Rule 801(d)(1)(A) 4 and Rule 4035 will have a substantial impact on the operation of that Rule. The impact is
apparent in the case of the turncoat witness, where the prior
* Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. B.A., 1958, Syracuse University; J.D., 1961, Yale University.
1. 28 U.S.C.A. FEDERAL RULES oF EVIDENCE 101-1103 (1975) [hereinafter cited as FED.
R. EvID.].
2. See note 11 infra and accompanying text.
3. FED. R. EVID. 607 provides:
The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the
party calling him.
For a discussion of this rule see 3 J. WEINSTEIN& M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
607[01]-607[09] (1975) [hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN & BERGER].
4. FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(1)(A) provides:
The following definitions apply under this article:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the
trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with his testimony,
and was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial,
hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition ....
As originally proposed by the Supreme Court, Rule 801(d)(1) would have permitted
all prior inconsistent statements to be used substantively as long as the declarant testifies
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement. In California v. Green, 399
U.S. 149 (1970), the Supreme Court held that substantive use of a prior inconsistent
statement did not violate the sixth amendment. Id. at 164. The Rule as amended allows
substantive use of only those prior inconsistent statements which were made under oath
subject to the penalty of perjury, and further requires that the declarant be subject to
cross-examination concerning the statement at the subsequent trial or hearing. Cf. United
States v. DeSisto, 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964); United States
v. Cunningham, 446 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1971).
5. FED. R. EvID. 403 provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
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inconsistent statement is the prosecution's primary tool in
attacking its own witness.
Rule 801(d)(1)(A), 8 as adopted, retains that portion of the
common law rule which mandates that certain prior inconsistent
statements may not be introduced as substantive evidence but
may be used only for the limited purpose of impeaching the credibility of the witness. A statement which qualifies for admission,
albeit for a limited purpose, under 801(d)(1)(A), might then be
totally barred if it fails to survive the probative value versus
prejudice analysis required by Rule 403.1 If the statement survives
the scrutiny of a Rule 403 analysis, a jury charge will be required
which even the most conscientious jury will be unable to follow.8
Thus, Rule 801(d)(1)(A) in conjunction with Rule 403 undermines the potential benefits to a prosecutor of the new Rule 607.
Congress' failure to permit substantive use of all prior inconsistent statements where the declarant is presently available for
cross-examination may force prosecutors, deprived of what is potentially the most relevant evidence in their case, to engage in the
subterfuge of offering a statement for impeachment purposes in
the hope that, despite the court's instruction to the contrary, the
jury will give the statement substantive weight."
The difficulty facing a prosecutor is illustrated most clearly
in the turncoat witness situation-the type of case which cried
out for abrogation of the common law vouching rule."0 This frequently encountered dilemma arises in the following manner. The
prosecution plans to call as its witness an individual who presumably will testify to an admission of guilt by the defendant or to
other highly damaging evidence. Prior to trial, the prosecutor
6. See note 4 supra.
7. See note 5 supra.

8. See United States v. DeSisto, 329 F.2d 929, 933 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
979 (1964); Asaro v. Parisi, 297 F.2d 859, 864 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 904
(1963). See also MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 503(b) (1942); 3A J. WIOMORE, EVIDENCE §
1018 (Chadbourn rev. 1970); Ladd, Some Observations on Credibility: Impeachment of
Witnesses, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 239, 249 (1966). For further discussion of this topic see text
accompanying notes 45-47 infra.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183, 189 (4th Cir. 1975).
10. At common law the party who calls the witness is held to vouch for such witness'
credibility, and hence may not attempt to impeach the credibility of its own witness. See,
e.g., United States v. Jannsen, 339 F.2d 916 (7th Cir. 1964). See also C. McCoRMcic,

§ 38 (Cleary ed. 1972); 3A J. WIOMORE, supra note 8,
§ 909; Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witness-New Developments, 4 U. CHI. L. REV.

HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE

69 (1936); MCCORMICK, The Turncoat Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive
Evidence, 25 TEX. L. REV. 573 (1947).
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Rules 607, 801(d)(1)(A) and 403

obtains a statement from the witness attesting to the defendant's
alleged admissions. When called to testify at the trial, however,
the witness denies that defendant made the alleged admission. At
this point the prosecution would seek to offer the witness' pretrial
statement.
Prior to the adoption of Rule 607, the pretrial statement
could not be admitted unless the prosecution could convince the
court that it was both surprised and affirmatively damaged by
the witness' in-court testimony." If admitted, the statement
2
could only be used to impeach the credibility of the witness.' It

could not be offered as substantive proof against the defendant
without running afoul of the hearsay rule."
The demonstration of surprise and affirmative damage was
often difficult.'4 If the government knew prior to trial that the
witness recanted the statement, no showing of surprise could be
made." Moreover, even if surprise could be satisfactorily proved,
mere denial by the witness that defendant had made the statement was considered neutral and not affirmatively damaging.' 6
Apparently, the question of damage was viewed not from the
11. See, e.g., United States v. Allsup, 485 F.2d 287, 291 (8th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Coppola, 479 F.2d 1153, 1158 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Scarbrough, 470 F.2d
166, 168 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Watson, 450 F.2d 290, 291 (8th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 993 (1972); Goings v. United States, 377 F.2d 753, 759 (8th Cir. 1967),
appeal after remand, 393 F.2d 884, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 883 (1968); Bushaw v. United
States, 353 F.2d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 921 (1966); Thomas, The
Rule Against Impeaching One's Own Witness: A Reconsideration, 31 Mo. L. REv. 364
(1966); Comment, Impeaching One's Own Witness, 49 VA. L. Rav. 996 (1963).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 487 F.2d 112, 123 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 981 (1973); United States v. Hill, 481 F.2d 929, 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1115 (1973); United States v. Gregory, 472 F.2d 484, 487 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Dobbs, 448 F.2d 1262, 1263 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Washabaugh, 442 F.2d 1127,
1130-31 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Miles, 413 F.2d 34, 37 (3d Cir. 1969); Carmady
v. United States, 351 F.2d 796, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
13. Ladd, supra note 8,at 249. If offered substantively, the prior statement would
be offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the out-of-court statement and
hence be hearsay. Common law purists gave no ground on this despite the fact that with
the witness present and subject to cross-examination, oath and demeanor observation by
the jury, none of the dangers of hearsay were present. If the prior statement is unswom
and not subject to the penalties of perjury, the same result obtains under the Federal Rules
of Evidence. See FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(1)(A).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Miles, 413 F.2d 34 (3d Cir. 1969).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Coppola, 479 F.2d 1153, 1158 (10th Cir. 1973); Doss v.
United States, 431 F.2d 601, 604 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Miles, 413 F.2d 34, 38
(3d Cir. 1969); Bushaw v. United States, 353 F.2d 477, 480 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 921 (1966).
16. See, e.g., Goings v. United States, 377 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1967); Bushaw v. United
States, 353 F.2d 477 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 921 (1966).
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standpoint of the disappointment of the prosecution but rather
from the perspective of the jury. At this point the jury would be
unaware of the importance of the prior statement to the prosecution's case and would have no context within which to assess
its impact. If, instead of denying that defendant had made the
statement, the witness testified that he or she had not heard
defendant's admission and that defendant was out of town at the
time the statement was allegedly made, then affirmative damage
could be shown."
Overcoming the barriers of surprise and affirmative damage
was not, however, the end of the prosecution's problem. Assuming
further that the turncoat witness possessed the government's
principal evidence against the defendant, admission of the prior
inconsistent statement into evidence while limiting its use to
impeaching the credibility of that witness could leave the prosecution in the position of having failed to make a prima facie
case. 8 Since the prior inconsistent statement was not substantive
proof, the jury might disbelieve the witness' in-court denial but,
under traditional theory, could not draw the negative inference.
That is, disbelief of the turncoat witness was not affirmative evidence of defendant's guilt, 9 and thus, defendant could be entitled
to a dismissal at the close of the prosecution's case.
Under the new Federal Rules of Evidence, the requirements
of surprise and affirmative damage as prerequisites to impeaching the credibility of the turncoat witness were ostensibly eliminated by Rule 607.0 However, since Rule 801(d)(1)(A) admits as
nonhearsay substantive proof only sworn prior inconsistent statements given at a proceeding under the penalty of perjury, the
unsworn or informal inconsistent statement of the witness is still
available only to attack the witness' credibility. Although the
drafters of the Federal Rules had elected to admit all prior inconsistent statements substantively as nonhearsay, provided the
declarant was under oath and available for cross-examination at
trial, 2 1 Congress limited the drafters' proposal to sworn state17. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, at 76 nn. 74 & 75. See also United States v. Pacelli,
470 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 983 (1973).
18. United States v. DeSisto, 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 979 (1964);
United States v. Rainwater, 283 F.2d 386 (8th Cir. 1959); Eisenberg v. United States, 273
F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1959).
19. See note 8 supra.
20. United States v. Carter, No. 75.2216 (4th Cir. 1976); Weinstein, FederalRules of
Evidence-A Judge's View, 174 N.Y.L.J. 80 (Oct. 23, 1975), at 1, col. 2.
21. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
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Rules 607, 801(d)(1)(A) and 403
ments made under penalty of perjury.22
Admittedly, the coercion inherent in the threat of a prosecution for perjury may motivate some witnesses to be more forthright and thus may add some reliability to a statement rendered
under oath. It has been manifest for a very long time, however,
that the principal check on the veracity of a witness' testimony
is not the oath but rather the opportunity for a searching crossexamination. 23
While there is a distinction between prior statements given
under oath at a proceeding and those uttered informally, the
informality of the prior statement ought not render it automatically unrealiable as a matter of law. The question is not whether
one sort of statement carries greater indicia of reliability than
another but rather whether the circumstances pursuant to which
the prior statement was given, coupled with a present availability
of the witness for cross-examination, oath and observation, provide sufficient reliability for admissibility of the statement as
24
substantive evidence.
Yet Congress has opted for an all-or-nothing approach in
Rule 801(d) (1) (A). The court is not given the discretion to weigh
the reliability of the particular informal prior utterance.2 5 Its use
United States, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES

OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES

DISTRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES, 46 F.R.D. 161, 331, 335-36 (1969); Committee on Rules

of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States,

REVISED DRAFT

OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES, 51
F.R.D. 315, 413-16 (1971); RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND
MAGISTRATES, 56 F.R.D. 183, 293, 295-96 (1972).
22. S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 93-1597, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1974).
23. See generally 5 B. JONES, CossME.;TARIES ON EVIDENCE, § 2333 (2d ed. 1926); C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 19; W. RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE, § 488 (10th ed. 1973); 5 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 8, §§ 1362, 1365, 1367, 1368.
24. United States v. DeSisto, 329 F.2d 929, 933-34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
979 (1964).
25. The belief that unsworn prior inconsistent statements are less reliable than those
rendered under oath and subject to the penalties of perjury is inherent in the Congressional rejection of Rule 801(d)(1)(A) as originally proposed by the Supreme Court. It has
been argued that despite the rejection of the draft rule, informal prior inconsistent utterances may nevertheless qualify for substantive use as an exception to the hearsay rule
pursuant to Rule 803 (24). See Graham, Examinationof a Party's Own Witness, 54 TEx.
L. REV. 917 (1976). This analysis is based on classifying certain matters as nonhearsay in
Rule 801 while classifying other matters as exceptions to the hearsay rule in Rule 803. To
be sure, this is the fabric of the Rules which Congress enacted. Nevertheless, two items
raise a question of the true intent of Congress. First, the distinction between nonhearsay
and a hearsay exception breaks down almost at first glance. Admissions are categorized
as nonhearsay under Rule 801 despite the fact that they are always offered for their truth,
while statements offered only to show state of mind and not for their truth are received
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is limited to credibility. This may impel a result quite unforeseen
by the Congress inasmuch as when Rules 607 and 801(d)(1)(A)
are considered in light of Rule 403, it is arguable that the prosecutor may be blocked from offering the inconsistency entirely despite Rule 607's permission to impeach one's own witness."8 If this
be the case, surprise and damage, presumably removed as a qualification by Rule 607, may not be dead. Indeed, they may remain
essential ingredients in the Rule 403 probative value versus prejudice analysis.
Virtually all proffered evidence is subject to the analysis required by Rule 403.7 Pursuant thereto, evidence, though clearly
relevant, may be excluded if the court determines that its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. Consider, for example, the case of the turncoat witness
who has made an unsworn out-of-court statement or even a sworn
statement not given under penalty of perjury. When the prosecution offers to impeach by use of the statement, the probative
value thereof is limited to the question of the credibility of the
witness. No substantive use is permitted and the jury will be so
charged. It may choose to disbelieve the testimony of the witness,
but it may not draw the inference that defendant actually made
an admission and use that admission substantively against defendant. Assuming that the prior inconsistent statement does contain admissions of guilt by defendant or other highly damaging
evidence, the defendant may claim that the possible prejudice
substantially outweighs the quite limited probative value of the
evidence and thus should not be admitted.
The probative value of evidence depends directly upon the
as exceptions to the hearsay rule pursuant to Rule 803(3). Second, the very reliability
analysis which led Congress to exclude informal utterances from Rule 801 coverage will
likely lead a trial judge to reject substantive use of the statement under Rule 803(24).
That much said, however, it must be acknowledged that Congress did enact the
catch-all provision in Rule 803(24). Having done so, the declared policy in Rule 801 must
be weighed against that other declared policy of Rule 803(24).
26. See text accompanying notes 1-9 supra.
27.

FED.

R. EVID. 403 merely codifies the common law powers of the trial judge, See,

e.g., Construction, Ltd. v. Brooks-Skinner Bldg. Co., 488 F.2d 427 (3d Cir. 1973); Smith
v. Spina, 477 F.2d 1140 (3d Cir. 1973). See also Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 66

F.R.D. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (opinion by Weinstein, J.); Vockie v. General Motors Corp.,
Chevrolet Div., 66 F.R.D. 57 (E.D. Pa. 1975); 1 WEINSTEIN & BEROER, supra note 3,
403[01]; Schmertz, Relevancy and its Policy Counterweights:A Brief Excursion Through
Article IV of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 33 FED. B.J. 1 (1974); Slough,
Relevancy Unraveled, 5 KAN. L. REv. 1 (1956); Trautman, Logical orLegal Relevancy-A
Conflict in Theory, 5 VAND. L. REV. 385 (1952); 174 N.Y.L.J. 81 (Oct. 24, 1975), at 1, col.
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Rules 607, 801(d)(1)(A) and 403
purpose for which the evidence is offered.2" Evidence offered for
the rather limited purpose of impeachment must be viewed differently from evidence offered substantively on an ultimate issue
in the case. For instance, where the prosecution wishes to offer a
prior conviction of the witness as circumstantial evidence affecting the truth and veracity of his present testimony,2 Rule
609(a) (1)10 grants the court the discretion to reject such evidence
unless its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. Rule
609(a) thus differs from the general principle embodied in Rule
403 which excludes the evidence only if the possible prejudice
substantially outweighs its probative value.
Where the evidence is relevant only to the credibility of the
witness, such factors as harassment or undue embarrassment,31
confusion of the issues, 2 misleading the jury3 and encouragement
of defendant to testify and give relevant evidence s' must be considered in ruling on admissibility. Where, however, evidence is
offered substantively, its relevance goes not merely to the general
credibility of the defendant but to an ultimate issue of the prosecution's case. Although such evidence is subject to the probative
value versus prejudice test of Rule 403, the courts have generally
admitted evidence of this type under criteria quite different from
those noted in connection with credibility. On this issue there will
be greater focus on the probative value of the evidence in proving
the government's case. Thus, where a prior inconsistent statement which qualifies under 801(d) (1)(A) for substantive treatment is offered, in the context of this discussion, neither confu28. See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, § 185; 1 J. WIGMoRE, EviDE ca §§
24-29(a) (3d ed. 1940).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Gloria, 494 F.2d 477 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
995 (1974); United States v. Rodriguez-Hernandez, 493 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1974); United

States v. Villegas, 487 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. White, 427 F.2d 634 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); United States v. Evans, 398 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1968).
30. FED. R. EvID. 609(a) provides:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has
been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established
by public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which

he was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.

31. See FED. R. Evm. 611(a)(3). See also Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931).
32. See, e.g., Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933).
33. See, e.g., Construction, Ltd. v. Brooks-Skinner Bldg. Co., 488 F.2d 427 (3d Cir.

1973).
34. See, e.g., Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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sion nor misleading of the jury can be a serious issue. Absence of
surprise will not bar the statement.3 Nor must the government
show affirmative damage to its case." Instead, the inherent relevance of the evidence rendered under circumstances ruled reliable
by Congress will mandate the admissibility of the evidence. A
showing that prejudice substantially outweighs probative value
will be difficult to make.
The situation, therefore, is similar to the case where evidence
of a prior conviction or bad act offered to impeach will be refused
whereas the identical evidence offered substantively to show intent,3 motive,3" plan,39 knowledge," identity and the like will be
received. 2 The evidence offered substantively may have major
importance in proving the government's case. It will be highly
probative of defendant's guilt and will be admitted despite the
high degree of prejudice inherent in the use of the statement. If,
however, the evidence were offered merely to impeach the credibility of the witness, the admittedly high degree of prejudice
might substantially outweigh its probative value and thus bar its
admissibility.
Under the common law, the surprise and affirmative damage
tests were formulated as a deterrent to prosecutorial violation of
both the vouching and hearsay rules. 3 Congress has insisted on
maintaining the hearsay bar to the substantive use of informal
prior inconsistent statements. Given that policy declaration by
Congress, where the government has advance knowledge that its
witness has recanted, it is absurd to allow it to create confusion
and prejudice against itself by (a) putting the witness on the
stand and (b) then claiming that the confusion so created man35. See, e.g., United States v. Jordano, 521 F.2d 695 (2d Cir. 1975). See also Weinstein, supra note 20.
36. United States v. Carter, No. 75-2216 (4th Cir. 1976).
37. United States v. Hasley, 465 F.2d 968 (9th Cir. 1972); FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
38. United States v. Johns, 466 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1972); FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
39. United States v. Martinez, 466 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1972); FED. R. EVID, 404(b).
40. Hernandez v. United States, 370 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1966); FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
41. Robinson v. United States, 459 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1972); FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
42. Nor is admissibility limited to these stated issues. Any demonstrably relevant
issue will do. See, e.g., People v. Jackson, 39 N.Y.2d 64, 346 N.E.2d 537, 382 N.Y.S.2d
736 (1976); Stone, The Rule of Exclusion of SimilarFact Evidence: America, 51 HARV. L.
REv. 988 (1938).
43. See generally Ladd, supra note 8, at 250; Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own
Witness-New Developments, 4 U. Cm. L. Rav. 69 (1936); Thomas, The Rule Against
Impeaching One's Own Witness: A Reconsideration,31 Mo. L. REv. 364 (1966); Comment,
Impeaching One's Own Witness, 49 VA. L. REv. 996 (1963).
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Rules 607, 801(d)(1)(A) and 403

dates that it be permitted to impeach the witness by introducing
an out-of-court statement which is highly prejudicial and which
cannot be used as substantive evidence. Here the prejudice to the
defendant seems to outweigh the probative value of the evidence.
It is submitted that barring a Congressional amendment, part of
the probative value-prejudice analysis with respect to the credibility of the witness should include the questions of surprise and
affirmative damage.
To ignore the traditional analysis simply because Congress
has enacted Rule 607 is unwarranted. Clearly, the prosecutor with
knowledge of the witness' intent to repudiate the earlier statement could opt not to call the witness. The purpose in calling the
witness to the stand is not to impeach his credibility but rather
to have the jury hear the prior inconsistent statement and use it
substantively." The prosecutor is fully aware that it is impossible
for the jury to follow an instruction not to use the statement
substantively.
The logical impossibility of the situation is seen at the point
where the jury believes that the out-of-court statement is true
and the present testimony false. It then becomes impossible for
the jury to believe the out-of-court statement implicating the
defendant and yet give it no weight on the question of the defendant's substantive guilt or innocence.4 5 To be sure, the jury could
believe that defendant made the admission but doubt the admission's truthfulness. Even that conclusion, however, would involve
use of the statement by the jury to determine defendant's guilt
or innocence rather than the credibility of the impeached witness.
No more glaring case of confusing and misleading the jury can be
imagined." In making the determination with regard to jury confusion, the fact that the government has neither been surprised
nor damaged by the inconsistency will be key to a determination
of the issue.
The root cause of this dilemma is the insistence on maintaining the common law rule that prior inconsistent statements of
this type are hearsay when offered substantively. Hearsay is a
rule of reliability and not one of absolute exclusion.47 Reliability
44. See, e.g., United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183, 190 (4th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Dunmore, 446 F.2d 1214, 1221 (8th Cir. 1971).
45. Asaro v. Parisi, 297 F.2d 859, 864 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 904 (1963).
46. United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183, 190 (4th Cir. 1975).
47. For a general discussion of the hearsay rule see 3 B. JONES, supranote 23, § § 107593; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 10, §§ 244-53; W. RCHARDSON, supra note 23, §§ 200-08; J.
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may be provided by the circumstances of trustworthiness under
which the statement was made and the availability of the declarant for full cross-examination.
By characterizing formal prior inconsistent statements as
nonhearsay, Congress has determined that these are per se reliable. Limiting the use of other inconsistent statements to impeach
credibility is a legislative judgment that statements of this type
contain hearsay dangers not present in the situation where there
is a penalty of perjury. It is not a judgment that the statement is
per se unreliable, for that ought to result in complete exclusion.
Instead, it is a determination by Congressional fiat of relative
degrees of reliability-a determination which, in other situations,
is left to the discretion of the trial judge.48 It seems apparent that
there is an abundance of cases in which there may be greater
reliability in the unsworn rather than the sworn statement.
Where cross-examination is available, the determination of reliability seems an appropriate one for the discretion of the trial
court.
The refusal of Congress to adopt the drafters' proposal, which
would have permitted substantive use of all prior inconsistent
statements where the opportunity for in-court cross-examination
is available, was motivated by a number of expressed fears. These
included the danger that pressure would be increased to secure
more pretrial statements,49 that untrue statements would be obtained for use at trial by oppressive insurance adjusters," that
trials would be cluttered by prior statements and that trials
would proceed by the use of carefully written statements drafted
in lawyers' offices.5 '
It seems certain that the trial courts have ample weapons at
their disposal to deal with each of the fears expressed by the
supra note 28, §§ 1360-65; Maguire, The Hearsay System: Around and Through
the Thicket, 14 VAND. L. REV. 741 (1961); Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application
of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177 (1948).
48. For example, FED. R. EVID. 104 states that preliminary questions of admissibility
of evidence are to be determined by the court, and FED. R. EvID. 803 (24) and FED. R.
EVID. 804(b)(5) allow, inter alia, for the admission of certain hearsay statements where
the court determines that "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" are present. See
4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 3, T 800[03].
49. Dow, KLM v. Tuller: A New Approach to Admissibility of PriorStatements of a
Witness, 41 NEB. L. REV. 598, 607 (1962).
50. Report, New Jersey Supreme Court, Comm. on Evidence 135 (1963).
51. 4 Calif. L. Rev'n Comm'n, Reports, Recommendations and Studies, Tentative
Recommendation Relating to the Uniform Rules of Evidence-Hearsay Evidence 307, 313
(1962).
WIGMORE,
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Rules 607, 801(d)(1)(A) and 403
opponents of the Advisory Committee's recommendation. Given
modern discovery techniques and the substantial pretrial process,
it is inconceivable that lawyers and their agents will be taking a
greater number of pretrial statements of witnesses than they do
presently. The reality of pretrial discovery and other proceedings
virtually mandates that statements be taken from all possible
witnesses in advance of trial. The wide use of pretrial depositions,
interrogatories, notices to admit, verification and authentication
of documents at pretrial conferences, for example, leave counsel
no room to ignore witnesses' statements." Moreover, since
pretrial statements may be used to impeach the credibility of the
witness at trial, the wise practitioner memorializes all possible
pretrial statements. Permission to use such statements substantively cannot expand the taking of pretrial statements inasmuch
as all possible statements are taken anyway.
Similarly, permitting substantive use of all prior inconsistent
statements where the declarant is available for cross-examination
provides no greater motivation for the use of fraudulent statements than now exists. If an attorney is prepared to perpetrate
fraud or to suborn perjury by use of a prior statement to impeach
credibility, something that can be done now, the same attorney
would be prepared to perpetrate a fraud to obtain substantive
evidence. There is no perfect check on the use of perjured or
fraudulent evidence. Cross-examination is our best tool to uncover such unpleasantries. Substantive use of the prior statement
is founded upon the availability of cross-examination of the declarant. It is cross-examination at trial which supplies the reliability check, not the purported formality of the pretrial deposition
statement.
The fear that the trial will become cluttered with pretrial
inconsistent statements is unrealistic. If the prior statement is
consistent with the trial testimony, its admissibility is quite limited by Rule 801(d)(1)(B).5 3 If it is inconsistent, it will be used
52. These discovery techniques, pioneered in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
have now been given counterparts in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See FED.
R. CRIM. P. 15, 16, & 17.
53. FED. R. EVID. 801 provides, in relevant part:
The following definitions apply under this article:
(d)

Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or
hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement,
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precisely as it is presently used; only the effect will be changed.
The witness will be confronted with his prior inconsistency as he
is now. The jury will, however, be permitted broader use of the
prior statements thus obviating the problems now faced in the
rule against negative inferences-a rule which is impossible for
the jury to follow.
The final expressed danger is that counsel will carefully draft
the witness' statement in the quiet of his office and offer the
statement as the witness' direct testimony. With the exception of
cases involving expert witnesses, the fear is seemingly overstated.
Preparation of witnesses in counsel's office is a widespread, necessary and proper practice. Lawyers generally prefer to have the
jury view the demeanor of their witnesses during direct testimony
delivered spontaneously at trial. Where expert witnesses are involved, however, it may be preferable to have their direct testimony predrafted.5 4 In either case, live cross-examination should
overcome all of the objections raised.
The prior inconsistent statement of the turncoat witness is
likely to be part of the most relevant evidence in the prosecution's
case. If on the basis of a Rule 403 analysis the court is persuaded
that the jury ought to hear the evidence, the prior statement
should be admitted without the confusing, cumbersome and
hopeless posturing involved in limiting the use to which the jury
may put the evidence. If the jury should hear it at all, it should
hear it substantively.
and the statement is . . . (B) consistent with his testimony and is
offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive. . ..
54. For a discussion of this subject see Ordover, The Use of Written Direct Testimony
in Jury Trials:A Proposal,2 HOFSTRA L. Rlv. 67 (1974).
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